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It is not the purpose of these remarks to comment on the various conflicts
considered by Professor Walker. Rather, they seek to draw attention to general
problems relating to naval warfare law raised by the paper.
Professor Walker righdy draws attention to the varied sources or agencies
from which evidence as to the rules on international law may be drawn, and
there can be no doubt that the rules ofarmed conflict may be drawn from similar
sources, bearing in mind in this context the significance of the Martens clause
with its reference to "usages established among civilized peoples, the laws of
humanity and the dictates of the public conscience". 1 While it is true that Hague
Convention IV relates to warfare on land, it cannot be denied that these same
basic principles are ofgeneral application, regardless of the theatre involved. This
view finds some support in the Preamble to Convention IX of 1907 relating to
Bombardment by Naval Forces,2 which expressly refers to "the desire to serve
the interests of humanity and to diminish the severity and disasters of war."
Care must be taken, however, not to exaggerate the significance of analogies,
for, as Judge Badawi Pasha has pointed out,3 "in international law, recourse to
analogy should only be had with reserve and circumspection." Caution must
therefore be exercised in applying the rules which have been enunciated for one
dimension of activity to another, unless the rules in question are of so general a
character that it is obvious that they are intended to apply to armed conflict
generally, regardless ofwhether it be conducted on land, at sea or in the air. This
is particularly important in relation to Protocol I which expressly states in Article
49 that "the provisions of [the] Protocol with respect to attacks apply to all attacks
in whatever territory conducted, including the national territory belonging to a
Party to the conflict but under the control of an adverse Party." This latter
reference to 'territory under the control of an adverse party' clearly implies that
it relates to land. Moreover, the Article goes on to state that its "provisions ...
apply to any land, air or sea warfare which may affect the civilian population,
individual civilians or civilian objects on land. They further apply to all attacks .from
the sea • •. against objectives on land but do not otherwise qffoct the rules of international
law applicable in armed conflict at sea . ... (emphasis supplied)4 Clearly, therefore,
the Protocol is only of direct effect insofar as naval warfare is concerned when
that warfare is directed against the land. As to warfare at sea, whether it involves
belligerent or neutral shipping or nationals belonging to an adverse party or to
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a neutral power, it is the traditional customary law, plus the relevant Hague
Conventions that govern, and the Protocol provision "has no application to
ship-to-ship ... combat. ,,5 The Protocol, therefore, is only relevant to the extent
that it reproduces customary rules of warfare which may be regarded as of a
general or fundamental character. Thus, rules regarding proportionality would
be relevant,6 for "[t]he principle of proportionality is a general principle of the
law of armed conflict which has found its expression in such provisions as the
prohibition of ,unnecessary' suffering" in Article 23(c) of the Hague Regulations
annexed to Convention IV? These comments apply even more emphatically
to the Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law of the United States,S which
does not purport to deal in any way with the law of armed conflict other than
somewhat superficially in regard to war crimes. Any comments made in the
Restatement concerning the registration of ships or any other matter can hardly
be said to "provoke a[ny] spillover effect into the law of armed conflict.,,9
In his paper, Professor Walker has excluded any consideration of sea to air
engagements, whether directed against enemy or neutral aircraft. However, it
should be noted that civil aircraft are as much "transports" as are merchant ships,
while NWP 9 constandy coalesces its comments regarding both seagoing vessels
and aircraft. It is perhaps proper, therefore, that at least some comment be made
with regard to the targeting of civil aircraft. There can be no question that if
there is ample evidence to indicate that a neutral aircraft is so assimilated to the
forces or service of an adverse party, it is as amenable to attack as is a neutral
merchant vessel in similar circumstances. However, the restrictions which
traditional naval warfare law imposes with regard to the safety ofpersonnel would
not be normally applicable if such aircraft were attacked. The problem of a civil
aircraft belonging to a belligerent arose in its most glaring form in relation to the
attack upon an Iranian civil aircraft by the USS Vincennes during the Gulf War.
This is perhaps not the place to consider whether the United States was in the
position of a belligerent during that conflict and, if so, the identity of its adverse
party. The fact that Captain Rogers considered himself to be under attack and
the fact that United States naval forces were engaged in combat with Iranian
vessels on occasion enables us to comment at least briefly on this particular
incident. This attack, combined with warnings directed also to neutral aircraft
in the vicinity of U.S. naval craft, while flying in an internationally recognized
scheduled airlane, emphasizes the importance of careful attention not only to
rules of engagement, but also to the factual situation, proper reading of technological information and, especially, the maintenance of proper training and
discipline on individual vessels. The issue of wrongful determination of the
intention of an aircraft in the vicinity of operations must, in the first instance,
be the responsibility of the naval commander, provided, however, that he
exercises all reasonable precautions that may be expected of one of his rank when
in action. This is particularly important in view of the provision in NWP 910
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that "civilian airliners in flight are subject to capture but are exempt from
destruction ••• unless at the time of the encounter they are being utilized by
the enemy for a military purpose ... or refuse to respond to the directions of
the intercepting warship." It is also probably required that the naval commander
should be reasonably certain that his "directions" are received and understood.
It is recognized that this may put a heavy burden upon the naval commander in
question, but it would appear, since such aircraft are prima facie immune from
destruction, that the burden of denying immunity or protection rests upon him..
Although, as has been pointed out, Professor Walker has drawn attention to
the problem of proportionality, which may be said to underlie the whole of the
law of armed conflict, and although he comments on it in the light of Protocol
I,ll it is suggested that he perhaps over-extends the analogies from land warfare
with which the relevant sections of the Protocol deal. It is further suggested that
he has not fully discussed the problem as it may arise in actual naval combat. A
merchant vessel which may well be a legitimate target in the circumstances may
nevertheless have to be granted immunity from attack on account of the
disproportionate damage that would ensue, particularly to the environment or
of a long-term character, ifan attack were launched. This issue could easily arise
if the vessel in question were an oil tanker or, even more seriously, nuclearpowered. He bases his approach to this issue on the attacker's intent to destroy
the vessel, without paying sufficient attention to the direct and reasonably
anticipated consequences ofsuch an attack. 12 In such a case it might well be that,
regardless of the legitimacy of the target, a naval commander might be required
by his rules ofengagement to consult with his political masters whether an attack
should be undertaken. The effect of the destruction ofsuch a vessel, particularly
if that effect could result in damage to a neutral coast, might be so disproportionate to the advantage to be gained from a sinking that a commander would
be well-advised, ifhe is unable to capture the vessel, to allow it to continue on
its way.
A further problem arises concerning attacks on vessels carrying food, or, as in
the Korean war, fishing vessels-a problem that would be aggravated if the
adverse party was essentially a fish-eating state. While it is true that in customary
law food may be considered as conditional contraband, new attitudes with regard
to proportionality and the rights of non-combatants would require greater care
than may have been necessary in the past. Once again a commander might have
to weigh with care the effects ofa sinking upon the civilian population as distinct
from preventing a cargo of food that might be intended for the armed forces of
the adverse party. The fact that NWP 9 is silent on the status of even coastal
fishing vessels should not be taken to mean that such vessels belonging to
nationals of the adverse party are automatically to be considered as legitimate
targets either for sinking or capture, although if there is sufficient economic
intelligence available to suggest a reasonable conclusion that the food is in fact
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intended for the armed forces there would be justifiable grounds to seize the
vessel and submit it to prize jurisdiction. There is strong ground for arguing that,
regardless of technical and similar changes that have taken place in recent years,
the law remains as it was settled by Hague Convention XI 13 in 1907, until such
time as that Convention has been revised. It should be remembered that at
Nuremberg the Tribunal took the line that "by 1939 [after a mere thirty years
the] rules [laid down in Hague Convention IV] were recognized by all civilized
nations as being declaratory of the laws and customs of war which are referred
to in Article 6(b) of the Charter" establishing the Tribunal. 14 The Preamble to
Convention XI states that "it is expedient to lay down in written mutual
engagements the principles which have hitherto remained in the uncertain
domain of controversy. or have been left to the discretion of Governments."
Perhaps even more significant was the attitude of the Tribunal with regard to
the London Naval Agreement of 193015 and the 1936 Protocol16 concerning
unrestricted submarine warfare against merchant ships. The fact that both sides
had indulged in such warfare did not remove guilt from Doenitz and Raeder17
in respect of having ordered such breaches of the law. The law remains despite
naval practice, but punishment for breaches in such circumstances may be
discounted.
In this regard, it must be emphasized that international law is the product of
state practice as evidenced by custom or by agreement in treaty. However, the
mere fact that a treaty has not been amended or denounced does not mean that
it remains declaratory of the law when belligerents have ceased to comply with
its provisions. Such behavior may indicate that the treaty has fallen into desuetude
and that the contrary practice, particularly when pursued by both sides without
protest or attempt to indict an adverse party with criminality, is a better indication
of what they consider acceptable or legitimate.
Professor Walker suggests 18 that "[a]n inference could be made that the
negotiators [of the 1949 Geneva Convention on the Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea19] would not have included [in
its protective provisions] all merchant seamen, including those aboard enemy
merchant vessels, if they did not feel that all such ships were subject to attack,
which had become the norm during World War II." It could perhaps even more
easily be inferred that it was because such conduct had become the norm during
World War II, the draftsmen sought to protect such merchant seamen and to
emphasize that if they were the victims of unlawful attacks they were still to be
protected.
While it may be true that the humanitarian law of armed conflict is part of
the law of human rights, it may be submitted that the instance cited in the Walker
. "a war 0 f genocl·cIal expenmentatlOn
. . at sea, or an [order
R eport20 concernmg
by an] individual commander that directs execution of a captured crew with
genocidal intent" does not need any reference to general human rights law or
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the specific crime of genocide. In view of the accepted law with regard to war
crimes, regardless of the theatre in which they are committed, to base criminality
on the general body of human rights law in such circumstances would only
amount to "gilding the lily". The reference21 to the perfidious use of the
protective emblem with regard to cultural property is not confined to a vessel
purporting to be carrying such property. It is of general application with regard
to the use of any protective emblem, and is merely indicative of the problem
that will face any commander who suspects that an emblem is being improperly
used. Similarly, it is suggested that the references made to the 1958 Law of the
Sea Conventions are not really in point since they are dealing with the normal
uses of the sea in time of peace and do not purport in any way to affect the rights
of belligerents, for, as Professor Walker himself points out,22 the freedom of the
high seas is exercised-and therefore limited by- "the other rules of internationallaw" as well as the stipulations of the Convention. Equally the reference
in UNCLOS, 1982, that "the high seas shall be used only for peaceful purposes,,23 implies that the contents of that Convention have no relevance to naval
warfare, at least until such time as there is no doubt that naval warfare as
traditionally conducted is contrary to international law pcr sc.
Rather than drawing analogies from Protocol I, it might be better, particularly
in view of the number of major naval powers that have failed to ratify this
instrument, and of the fact that there is by no means universal agreement as to
which articles of the Protocol amount to rules of customary law in regard to
warfare on land, let alone to fundamental principles underlying the law ofarmed
conflict as such, to ignore the terms of the Protocol and seek to evolve a draft
applicable to naval warfare alone. Moreover, it should be remembered that
Protocol I is intended to elaborate the Geneva Conventions of 1949 as they
apply to humanitarian law in armed conflict. In the light of the experience of
World War II and the technological advances that have evolved since, it would
appear that the various Hague and later agreements concerning naval warfare
have become somewhat archaic and tend to be disregarded. Experience in the
Gulf War and the use of protective fleets by non-participants suggest that it is
time to revise also the rights and duties of neutrals in naval warfare and to
re-examine their right to establish protective convoys,24 for it is submitted the
legal position is not as clear as Professor Walker asserts.25 Any such revision
would, of course, make use of any relevant principles to be found in the
agreements mentioned by Professor Walker.
However, to seek to extend to naval warfare principles especially drafted with
a view to the needs ofland warfare often makes the exercise somewhat artificial
and far-fetched. This is particularly true when the specific provisions of Protocol
I are incompatible with the customary or previously established treaty law
relevant to naval warfare. 26 The comments here made with regard to Protocol
I are equally applicable to the Protocols appended to the 1980 Conventional
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Weapons Convention.27 At the same time it should always be borne in mind
that the fact that neither a specific Convention nor customary law specifically
"requires or approves or permits" a particular line of conduct, such as the
establishment of a "Red Cross Box" during the Falklands conflict,28 does not in
any way prevent the parties to the conflict from setting up any similar "box" or
making any arrangement that they choose and, as between themselves, this
would even apply to an arrangement derogating from a treaty requirement. This
is probably true even of those agreements that have been made for the protection
of persons hors de combat, unless it can be maintained that the treaty provision in
question amounted to a principle of jus cop-ens applicable to the protection of
human rights even during armed conflict.29
In connection with the Gulf War and the destruction and attacks on neutral
shipping, Professor Walker draws attention to Commander Fenrick's comment: 30
It is somewhat surprising that the actions ofIran and Iraq in the Persian Gulf did
not generate a stronger, or at least more vociferous, response on the part of other
states. It is presumed the relative lack of response is owing to the desire of the
superpowers to avoid conflict with each other in a sensitive area ....
In view of the apparent willingness of the superpowers to tolerate the situation
and indulge in minesweeping, chartering or reflagging of vessels, it seems
unlikely that such a conflict might have ensued. Perhaps it may be suggested that
the reason for the lack of more vigorous response was that the superpowers were
not prepared to state that Iranian and Iraqi practices were in conflict with the
rights of belligerents to attack neutrals when there was some evidence to suggest
that they were in fact trading with or indirectly supporting a belligerent.
Moreover, practice during World War II, as well as during the Gulf War,
suggests that belligerents will disregard the former distinction between absolute
and conditional contraband or the requirement that contraband lists be published, and will instead seek to inhibit any trade with an adverse party, contending
that such trade automatically assists the economic war effort, which would appear
to be recognized by NWP 931 and this, moreover, seems to be Commander
Fenrick's current view?2 While it is true that both Fenrick's proposals and the
draft to have come out of Pisa and Bochum33 are completely unofficial, they
may be indicative of the manner in which the law of naval warfare, at least in
regard to the targeting of merchant vessels, might proceed.
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